This paper applies the concept of trade creation and diversion to immigration into the EU-15 in the 1980s and 1990s. In particular, the 1990s process of East-West integration, culminating in the May 2004 enlargement, could potentially create immigration from the new member countries and at the same time divert migration from non-EU countries. In this context, the question this paper tries to answer is fundamentally whether the extension of the EU Single Market to the new member countries has the potential to crowd-out non-EU immigrants. The analysis is carried out using trend analysis, Truman shares, and panel data gravity models. The results are quite robust to a range of regression methods, model specifications, dependent variables, and time periods. They broadly support the migration creation hypothesis, but the evidence on the migration diversion hypothesis is mixed. There is evidence of some diversion away from other non-member European countries, such as ex-USSR and ex-Yugoslavia countries, in favour of the new Central and Eastern European members. However, the evidence of diversion away from non-European countries is much weaker, if at all existent. The high impact of a common language, when compared to distance or even a common border, may help preserving migration channels from outside Europe. Within Europe, shorter distances and common borders become more relevant.
This item was submitted to Loughborough's Institutional Repository by the author and is made available under the following Creative Commons Licence conditions.
Introduction
The 1990s have seen a process of East-West integration in Europe that culminated in the 2004 enlargement. The real wages in the new member countries are on average five times lower than in Greece, Portugal and Spain, and ten times lower than in the wealthiest EU countries. These high wage differentials created anticipation for large flows of East-West migration and most of the EU-15 countries decided not to apply the Single Market requirement of free movement of labour for up to seven years after the enlargement. When these restrictions come to an end, the new member countries may find themselves in a privileged position with respect to outsiders. Given the free supply of workers from the new member states, the old EU members may decide to reduce the quotas of non-EU migrants. Hence the process of East-West integration could create immigration from the new member countries and at the same time divert migration from non-EU countries.
The concept of trade creation and diversion is by no means new in the trade integration literature (see, among others, Viner (1950) , Verdoorn and Meyer-zu-Schlochtern (1964) , Balassa (1967 ), Clavaux (1969 , Kreinin (1969) , Truman (1969) , Sellekaerts (1973) , Balassa (1974) , Dayal and Dayal (1977) ).
However, this concept has not been -to the best of the author's knowledge -applied to migration. This paper is borrowing the concepts of creation and diversion and using them to investigate whether the extension of the EU Single Market to the new member countries would crowd-out non-EU immigrants.
The Eurostat migration database used in the paper covers virtually all countries in the world over a period ranging from 1980 to 2000 and thus allows a comprehensive analysis of creation and diversion effects in immigration into the EU-15.
The paper's findings broadly support the migration creation hypothesis, but the evidence on the migration diversion hypothesis is mixed. There is evidence of some diversion away from other non-member
European countries, such as ex-USSR and ex-Yugoslavia countries, in favour of the new Central and Eastern European members. However, the evidence of diversion away from non-European countries is much weaker, if at all existent. The high impact of a common language, when compared to distance or even a common border, may help preserving migration channels from outside Europe. Within Europe, shorter distances and common borders become more relevant. The results are quite robust to a range of regression methods, model specifications, dependent variables, and time periods.
The paper is organised as follows. A preliminary analysis of trends is presented in Section 2. Section 3 uses Truman shares to determine whether there has been any substitution of Central and Eastern European migrants for the rest of the world. Section 4 uses a gravity model to investigate the determinants of bilateral immigration into the EU-15 during the 1980s and 1990s, and whether other world regions have shown stronger or weaker specific factors with respect to the CEECs. Section 5 performs robustness checks with respect to changes over time as East-West integration proceeded, different measures of origin (citizenship versus country of previous residence and country of birth), and whether immigrants are workers or non-workers. Section 6 concludes.
Data Features and Migration Trends
The migration data used in the paper comes from Eurostat's NewCronos Database and covers up to 4680 countries in a period that spans from 1981 to 2000, including both immigration flows and stocks. Table 1 describes all the variables available in the database. The information provided is very rich, although it is difficult to find a true panel for pairs of EU-15 and non-EU-15 countries. In this paper, only national data is used, which excludes codes (4) and (7). Among the data used in this paper, codes (1) and (2) represent immigration flows by country of previous residence and citizenship respectively, code (3) represents the stock of foreign workers by citizenship, codes (5) and (6) both represent the stock of foreign population by citizenship, and finally code (8) represents the stock of foreign population by country of birth. These distinctions allow the testing of robustness of results with respect to particular characteristics of migration, such as the temporary residence in an intermediate country that is not the country of birth, the change in citizenship that may accompany residence abroad, or the introduction of foreign residents that are not part of the workforce via family reunion or asylum-seeking. 20% 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Figure 2 represents foreign workers in each EU-15 country as a share of its population in the period . No data is available for Germany and only one year exists for Austria -in 1997, foreign workers accounted for 4.25% of Austria's population. Belgian data for the 1980s indicates a stable value around 2%, with the UK and Sweden having about 1.5% foreign workers among their population. In general, the stocks are quite stable, especially when compared with the volatility of the flows, which seems to indicate that at least some immigration is temporary and constant inflows do not contribute to comensurate increases in the stocks. 50% 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 198 1985 1986 7 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 igures 4 and 5 represent the share of those regions for which data is available in immigration flows and F stock of foreign citizens respectively. The patterns differ across the EU-15 countries. The inflow of CEECS nationals was most important in Austria and Germany, and also in Greece. It is in these countries that the share of CEECS in the stock of foreign nationals is higher. The inflow of North African nationals was more important in France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium. In these countries, North African immigrants form the largest group of foreign nationals. The Latin Americans have a large share in Spain and Portugal. In the latter country, the largest group of foreign nationals is that of immigrants is 00 and three sub-periods (1986-90, 1991-95, and 1996-2000) are sho then there was diversion from the CEECS to those groups (or vice-versa). Table 4 shows the results of a two-sided sign test and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The first simply classifies changes as negative and positive, whilst the second additionally ranks them according to magnitude. On the whole, Table 4 shows that in several cases the signs of changes in shares of sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey, Ex-USSR and Ex-Yugoslavia Republics, Tiny European countries, Albania, North America, and Oceania, significantly differ from those of the CEECS. There is also some (but weaker) evidence of a negative correlation for Asia, Latin America, and North Africa. Only the change in shares of the Middle East is never negatively linked to the change in shares of the CEECS. This is probably due to the fact that immigration from the Middle East is more linked to asylum than to economic migration. To know more about why the change in shares of other world regions is positively or negatively related to the change in hares of the CEECS, it would be necessary to study the characteristics of the migrants. This is left to However the share analysis can also be improved upon by looking origin and recipient countries that may influence migration flows in general. The next section presents a gravity model approach to isolating the effects of ersely lated to the physical distance between them (DIST). Country size is proxied by either GDP or nction of country wealth, s measured by GDP per capita (GDPPC). Migration flows should decrease with the origin country's DP per capita and increase with the recipient country's GDP per capita. The third main hypothesis is and/or former colonial ties that act as an incentive to migration. The dummies for the world regions s another paper.
at characteristics of such characteristics and distinguishing these from specific trends of each world region.
Gravity models
Two alternative gravity equations will be used in this section. The first equation is built around three main hypotheses. The first main hypothesis constitutes the very essence of gravity models: bilateral flows, in this case migration flows, are directly related to the size of the two countries concerned, and inv re population (POP). The second main hypothesis is that migration flows are a fu a G that migration flows are a function of unemployment rates (UR). Migration flows should increase with the origin country's unemployment rate and decrease with the recipient country's unemployment rate.
Finally, the length of common borders (BORDER), and dummies for common language (LANG) and world regions (REGION) are included. Common borders are usually porous, and thus are expected to have a positive impact on migration flows. Common languages can also proxy for a common culture described in Section 2 control for region-specific preferences that cannot be explained by the other factors. A negative sign would mean that the CEECs are the preferred region, or that the rest of the world less preferred. In Section 5, these dummies are interacted with time dummies for four time periods (1981-85, 1986-90, 91- 
, the G P per capita and th ment te of e h coun y with the abs lute va ue of t e diffe nce be r DPOP), DG PC, a DUR his is tende to co rol for e fact at mi ration ws m ore on the relative position of ountr than Alth ugh th migrat n wo chan with d fferen s in size, it ca be exp cted that diff ences i n nd in employ ent r s wou incre migr ion. T e mod ed eq ion is s follo s:
ata r distances a d borders was taken from the CEPII websi e (www.cepi fr) and www.nationmast r.com e respectively. Distance data is m asured km s' except for Germany (Hamburg is the city used).
e in between the partner countrie economic centres. These correspond to the capital city
Countries are considered to share a common border when they share a land border and its length is given in kms. Data for population (given in thousands) and for GDP (given in billions USD at 1995 prices and exchange rates) was taken from the web version of IMF's International Financial Statistics at www.imf.org. Migration data comes from the Eurostat NewCronos Database and the various measures of migration flows and stocks available were described in Table 1 . 
(1) Random effects with common AR(1); (2) FGLS with heterogeneous panels and panel-specific AR(1); (3) PCSEs with panel-specific AR(1). CEECS is the excluded dummy.
The benchmark regression results are provided in Tables 5 and 6 When looking at the dummies for world regions, only the ex-USSR countries show negative countryspecific factors with respect to the CEECS. This finding is in accordance to the share analysis of Section 3 and also reflects the importance of other world regions in the EU-15, as found in Section 2. 
Robustness of Regression Results
The benchmark results of Section 4 seem to sugg are no a priori reasons to suppose that the 
Country of previous residence and country of birth
Citizenship may not be the most accurate measure of an immigrant's true origin or migration path. Hence it is important to test the robustness of the results with respect to other measures. One is the country of previous residence (Table 9) , which measures indirect immigration, via a stopping country where the immigrant originates from but that may not necessarily be the country of citizenship. Another is the country of birth (Table 10) , which accounts for cases where the country of citizenship may differ from the country of birth. .39*** Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (1) random effects with common AR(1); (2) FGLS with heterogeneous panels and panel-specific AR(1); (3) PCSEs with panel-specific AR(1). CEECS is the excluded dummy.
Both the country of previous residence and the country of birth seem to be more accurate indicators of the origin of immigrants than the country of citizenship. A higher income in the country of previous residence (or in the country of birth) has a negative impact on outward flows and stocks of migrants, whereas a higher income in the destination countries has a positive impact on immigration. In addition, both stocks and flows of migrants tend to increase with income differences between the recipient country and the country of previous residence (or country of birth). Distance still has a negative impact on flows from the country of previous residence, this is, more immigrants flow into nearer countries. However, the impact of distance on stocks of foreign-born residents is very small and in some cases not significant. This result seems to indicate that distance may not play a role in the initial decision to leave the country of birth, but it may be an important factor in moving from one foreign country to another. There is no common language or common border in the country of birth dataset, however the results of Table 9 show that more immigrants move to a second country with the same language, but not necessarily adjacent. In addition, the impact of a common language, with a maximum significant value of 1.913, exceeds the impact of distance, with a maximum significant value of -1.276.
The results in Tables 9 and 10 support previous evidence that immigration from the CEECS has a potential to cause diversion away from other European countries, more than from non-European world regions. Whilst the latter show positive country-specific factors with respect to the CEECS, there is evidence that those previously residing or born in ex-USSR, ex-Yugoslavia, and Turkey, show negative country-specific factors.
Workers and non-workers
The previous data refers to total flows and stocks of foreign citizens, or alternatively individuals previously residents abroad, or born abroad. However it does not distinguish workers from non-workers. This is an important distinction because movements of workers are probably linked to economic variables, but movements of non-workers may not necessarily be. Hence it is important to know whether the previous results hold when only workers are considered. There is no data for inflows of workers with foreign citizenship, but the results for stocks of workers with foreign citizenship are provided in Table 11 .
The results in Table 11 are very similar to those in the benchmark Tables 5 and 6 in terms of sign and significance. The main difference pertains to the magnitude of the coefficients for common language and common border. When only workers are considered, the former loses importance (the highest significant coefficient value being 2.184) and the latter gains importance (the highest significant coefficient value being 0.492). As a consequence, workers with CEECS citizenship, sharing borders with the EU-15 but not (official) languages, would be in a stronger position than non-workers. This result would be expected to reflect negative country-specific effects for other world regions with respect to the CEECS. In fact, whilst in the benchmark Tables 5 and 6 only ex-USSR countries show negative country-specific effects throughout, in Table 11 also ex-Yugoslavia, TINY and Central America exhibit negative country-specific effects. .28*** 58521.13*** 8353.21*** NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (1) Random effects with common AR(1); (2) FGLS with heterogeneous panels and panel-specific AR(1); (3) PCSEs with panel-specific AR(1). CEECS is the excluded dummy.
Conclusions
This paper has used the Eurostat migration database to investigate whether in the EU-15 there is any evidence of crowding-out of non-EU immigrants by immigrants from the CEECS. As East-West integration proceeded and the 2004 enlargement took place, there could have been migration creation towards the integrating CEECS, but also migration diversion from the rest of the world towards the CEECS. The paper's findings reveal that the inflows of CEECS citizens during the 1990s into mostly Austria, Germany, and to a lesser extent Greece, have not negatively affected inflows of non-European citizens. However, the opening up of the EU-15 to the CEECS crowded-out the citizens of other European countries, namely from the former Yugoslavia, the former USSR, and very small European countries (Andorra, San Marino, etc).
The paper's analysis can help to shed some light on why this was so. There is a different regional distribution of foreign citizens in the EU-15, with a predominance of CEECS citizens in Austria, Germany and Greece, of North African citizens in France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, of Latin American citizens in Portugal and Spain, of sub-Saharan Africa citizens in Portugal and the UK, of Asian citizens in the UK. This geographical distribution is quite static across the 1980s and 1990s and did not change substantially with East-West integration. Why was this so?
The gravity estimation shows that the most important factor explaining the geographical distribution of immigration in the EU-15 is a common (official) language. The patterns described above translate to a large extent the knowledge of a common language (even if not the official language), which in turn is largely the product of former colonial relationships. These took precedence over East-West integration and were already firmly established when the CEECS started integrating with the EU-15. Language alone is more important than sharing a border with, or being at a short distance from, the EU-15. Only when the (official) language factor is removed, which happens within Europe, sharing a border and being closer to the EU-15 really matters. This may be why there is weak or no evidence of CEECS immigrants displacing non-European immigrants in the EU-15, but there is a trail of evidence pointing towards a crowding-out effect on the European countries that did not integrate with the EU-15.
Hence, when all the restrictions to the free movement of workers from the new member countries are removed -by 2011 at most -non-European countries should not be greatly affected, but the European utsiders can expect a negative impact on their participation in the European labour market. This effect will be reinforced by the fact that Austria and Germany are two EU-15 countries that have kept the most o severe level of restrictions and thus the greatest impact of lifting those restrictions should be felt there. As these two countries are also those where non-European countries are relatively less important origins of immigrants, and Central and Eastern Europe is a more important origin than average, the impact on the former should be minimised, but the impact on the latter should be maximised. As a consequence, the paper's findings reinforce the importance and point to a potential impact of building up the enlargement of the EU towards the East and the Southeast, so that the current European outsiders can become insiders to the European labour market.
The country data used in this paper has provided some insights, but it only tells a part of the story. In order to know more about why some groups of immigrants may or may not substitute others, it would be necessary to take a deeper look into a number of individual characteristics of the immigrants, such as age group, gender, qualifications and skills, previous occupation, among others. These characteristics are particularly important in a globalised world that more and more tends to manage international migration from the labour market's perspective, for example, enforcing point systems that stress qualifications and skills as the main criteria for the desirability of individual immigrants. This will be dealt with elsewhere.
